Kosovo and Metohija or the European Union ‒ a rhetorical dilemma in the Serbian political discourse by Marković, Ksenija et al.
173
UDC 316.42(497.11):323.173(497.115)
https://doi.org/10.22182/spm.6642019.8
Article received: 28.10.2019. 
Accepted for publishing: 26.11.2019. 
Original scientific paper
Ksenija Marković, Marko Jovanović, Branka Matijević
Ksenija Marković*42
Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade
Marko Jovanović**43
Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade 
Branka Matijević***44
Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade
Kosovo and Metohija or the European Union 
‒ a rhetorical dilemma in the Serbian political 
discourse
Abstract
As the loss of Kosovo has been de facto re-inflicted in recent 
years, the question should be raised as to how great an influence 
the Kosovo myth wields today. It is particularly interesting to 
consider the issue in the context of European integration and the 
fact that recognition of Kosovo and Metohija’s self-proclaimed 
independence is usually stated as an essential condition and a 
key obstacle to Serbia’s accession to the EU. It is an undisputable 
fact that Kosovo and Metohija and the Kosovo myth are a part of 
culture, history, religion, and folklore of Serbian people, and it is 
without doubt difficult to renounce all that, even if personal and 
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collective prosperity is offered in lieu of it, which is deemed by a 
certain portion of the Serbian public to come as a result of the acces-
sion to the EU. The aim of this paper is to establish which portion 
of public opinion is willing to make such a sacrifice in relation to 
the current attempts at resolution of the Kosovo question. It is the 
authors’ ambition to answer the following question: To what extent 
does the position on the status of Kosovo and Metohija influence 
the public opinion on Serbia’s membership in the European Union? 
With an intention of answering the research question the authors 
rely on the data acquired through empirical-quantitative study 
The Notions of the EU and Russia in the Serbian Public 2018, 
Institute of Social Sciences Belgrade, where a structured on-line 
questionnaire was used as a means of data collection. The study 
results clearly indicate the popular support for Serbia’s accession 
to the EU while at the same time the method of resolution of the 
Kosovo question deeply impacts the public opinion on Serbia’s 
membership in the EU. A conclusion can be drawn that, if the 
public is presented with the choice between Kosovo and the EU, 
the certainty of citizens opting for the EU will rapidly decline. 
Key words: Kosovo and Metohija, national identity, national 
myth, the European Union, European integration
Introduction 
The issue of social identities has proved itself to be an import-
ant factor in understanding political processes and events owing 
to a significant leverage of group identities over various aspects 
of collective behaviour (Vasović 2010: 75). Along with personal 
characteristics the identity of an individual is also conditioned 
by social aspects, which considerably affect his or her self-de-
termination through diverse types of group affiliations. The role 
of collective identity is to aid an individual in self-defining their 
place in the existing system of social relations (Vasović 2010: 82).
Certainly, one of the most consequential types of social iden-
tity is national identity which, accompanied by nationalism, has 
been for almost two centuries “the primary inducement of Europe’s 
fate” (Vasović 2015: 74). The national identity, predictably, was 
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and remains an essential subject matter for various social sciences. 
However, there is no universal and generally accepted definition 
of national identity and there is no general consensus over what 
the main factors and components of national identity are. In the 
literature, most frequently, language, religion, culture (music, folk 
oral lore), territory, common features and values, physical traits, 
etc. are underlined as defining components of national identity 
(Милошевић-Ђорђевић 2005: 125). The majority of authors assert 
the crucial role that a common language and culture, accompanied 
by national myths, had in national and political homogenisation and 
development of the sentiment of national belonging (Vasović 2015). 
One of the most eminent world theoreticians of nation and nation-
alism, Anthony Smith, indicates the close connection between 
national identity and mythology. He considers myths, along with 
memories, values, and symbols, to be the four pillars of the very 
core of ethnicity which he called ethnie (Vasović 2015: 72). With 
respect to the fact that the national mythology plays a significant 
role in strengthening national sentiment and sense of collective 
belonging, the authors of this paper start with three propositions. 
First, the national myths, as one of the determinants of national 
identity, are deeply embedded in the collective consciousness. 
Secondly, myths possess the ability of swift regeneration, adapta-
tion and transformation. Those qualities become prominent in the 
occasion of national identity crisis, or being in danger for various 
reasons, when myths easily revitalise and evolve from the passive 
collective historical memory to active initiators and determinants 
of social processes. Thirdly, in this paper, national identity is not 
understood as some primordial, invariable, deeply rooted, and 
innate human attribute, but, on the contrary, the dynamic nature of 
this phenomenon is acknowledged (Суботић 2011: 2-3). Therefore, 
it is important to mention adoption of the assumption that identity, 
whether personal or collective, is formed in “a specific socio-cul-
tural milieu which is susceptible to the dynamics and passage of 
historical time” (Стојадиновић 2018: 10). 
As far as Serbia is concerned, such role is certainly attributed 
to the Kosovo myth, which can be regarded as one of the pillars of 
Serbian national identity and sovereignty. This myth has existed for 
centuries in the collective consciousness of Serbian people, and in 
view of historical events of the several past decades and the fact that 
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the issue of resolution of Kosovo and Metohija’s status has been 
marked as the most urgent national concern; it is hardly surprising 
that the myth has acquired a new intensity and topicality. In the 
first part of this paper, the authors indicate historical genesis of the 
Kosovo myth and a special place that it holds in Serbian national 
tradition. The question of the Kosovo myth is deliberated in the 
current macropolitical and socio-cultural context where it is being 
manifested. In the second part of the paper, the authors endeavor 
to provide answers to research queries through analysis of the data 
acquired by the empirical study The notions of the EU and Russia 
in the Serbian public in 2018 conducted by the Institute of Social 
Sciences – Centre for politicological research and public opinion, 
which concluded that the final resolution of the status of the south-
ern Serbian province has large impact on the attitude of Serbian 
citizens towards a potential membership in the European Union.
The Kosovo myth 
National myths represent psychocultural narratives based 
on collective conscious, and as such they greatly influence the 
dynamics of social and political processes within a community. In 
that respect, national myths constitute “a conglomerate of various 
historical, religious and political ideas” used to provide a broader 
culture-based legitimacy for daily political interests and objectives, 
i.e. they are offered as culturally sustained justifications for collec-
tive actions. (Vasović 2015: 67-68). These myths can for centuries, 
in their latent form, continuously coexist in the conscience of the 
folk with almost no change in contents or structure level. But, if 
for some reason ethnic or national entity, among whose members 
the myth dwells, experiences crisis or a situation of intergroup con-
frontation and conflict, those myths abruptly revitalise and evolve 
from the passive collective historical memory to active initiators 
and determinants of social and political processes (Vasović 2015: 
75-76). 
In the case of Serbia, that function is undoubtedly delegated 
to the Kosovo myth, which is one of the pillars of Serbian national 
identity and sovereignty. In the Serbian folk culture Kosovo figures 
as a sacred place – a space refined by the characteristics of social 
identity, “a spiritual collective toponym, the centre of collective 
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cultural conscious” (Бошковић 2014: 479). Precisely on account 
of the fact that such a standpoint is entrenched in a certain segment 
of the population, the Kosovo myth has got a great mobilisation 
potential which can be instrumentalised for political purposes, if 
there is a will and need among political actors. 
This myth was conceived immediately after the Battle of 
Kosovo itself as a peculiar folk response to the endured historical 
trauma. Thereupon, tales and legends of that fateful battle started 
to be recorded and passed down. It could be said that even then the 
first phase of the Kosovo myth creation commenced. It has been 
continuously present in the conscience of the Serbian people, or 
at least certain segments of it, since as far back as the 14th century. 
The very core of the myth was built around historical facts, while 
a complex set of historical circumstances throughout the follow-
ing centuries has resulted in historical facts, which were initially 
recorded and interpreted in church chronicles, further, as Pešić 
notices, “fictionalised in the folk oral lore and transposed into epic 
structures through a technique of oral mediation” (Pešić 2019: 361). 
This complex and long-lasting process shaped the Kosovo 
myth through various stages of its existence. In time, the reli-
gious, literary and political discourses on Kosovo converged on 
and permeated one another (Bakić-Hayden 2006: 126). Although 
the Kosovo tradition was constantly present, only in the 19th cen-
tury did it take form of a fully developed myth. It is the period 
of strengthening nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and the Bal-
kans, an occurrence that did not bypass the Serbian people either 
(Čolović 2017: 7). The then popular leaders and ideologists of 
Serbian nationalism, started to use the evocation of the Battle of 
Kosovo for political purposes, thus providing the Kosovo tradition, 
which had been already ingrained in the folk oral storytelling, a 
new function. 
National liberation function of the myth instilled strength 
of Kosovo heroes into rebels in their revolt against the Ottoman 
government from the First Serbian Uprising onwards. The most 
famous reproductions of the Kosovo myth should be definitely 
sought in the folk epic poetry of the period, which would be col-
lected and published by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić several decades 
later (Čolović 2017: 8). Unquestionably, these epic poems hold a 
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special place in the national conscience, so that without their rec-
ognition it would be difficult to properly understand history and 
culture of the Serbian people (Čolović 2017: 21). Kosovo is, as 
Bakić-Hayden states, “a paradigm of collective self-awareness, a 
central metaphor in subsequent interpretations of the most import-
ant historical events of the 19th and 20th centuries” (Bakić-Hayden 
2006: 134). 
It is important to mention that the Kosovo myth reduced in 
its intensity after the struggle for liberation of Kosovo and other 
territories inhabited by Serbian population ended. Upon the end-
ing of the Balkan Wars and the First World War, the Kosovo myth 
simply could not retain the same role that it had in the previous 
century. Under new conditions, where the entire Serbian national 
corpus found itself in the same state and also unified with their 
other South Slavic brethren, the Kosovo myth underwent a certain 
transformation. Still, the Kosovo myth proved its multifarious 
applicability and perseverance by surviving and being evoked even 
in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia, during the Second World War, both among Partisan 
and Chetnik fighters, and equally after the end of the war in the 
Second Yugoslavia. However, it was not until the eighties of the 
20th century that the Kosovo myth experienced a true renaissance 
when it was made topical again amid growing nationalisms in the 
SFRY, ethnic tensions and crisis that sprung in Kosovo and Meto-
hija and preparations for the commemoration of the 600th anniver-
sary of the Kosovo Battle, by which the myth practically reached 
its culmination (Базић 2012: 267-268). The tragic breakup of the 
SFRY, and later on NATO aggression along with the creation of 
an international protectorate in the Kosovo and Metohija, then the 
failure of peacekeeping troops to protect Serbian interests accom-
panied by the strengthening of the Albanian separatist movement 
which culminated in the declaration of independence in February 
2008, with support of a part of the international community, have 
kept this myth vital in the years that followed. 
The Serbian people once again experienced the tragic loss of 
Kosovo. In his extensive study Kosovski kulturološki mit (Kosovo 
cultural myth), Bošković, discussing the first loss of Kosovo after 
the Ottoman invasion, characterises that painful experience of the 
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Serbian people as a loss of cultural landscape. Underlining “the 
strength of the collective cultural and national identity which trans-
forms the abstraction of a geographic area into a space of cultural 
landscape, a concrete place within whose boundaries the national 
and cultural map of a collective is being drawn”. This myth has 
evolved over generations “as a collective work of art” that had a 
function of an imaginary space where for centuries, during Ottoman 
occupation, the Serbian people survived. The author concludes 
that the Kosovo myth is “a spiritual projection of historical-spacial 
dimension of the Serbian people’s existence” which compensates 
for the loss of the real territory. 
In his study O srpskom političkom obrascu (Serbian Polit-
ical Pattern) Milan Matić emphasises the “essential components 
of a specific understanding and approach to politics and political 
issues, inherent to the Serbian people” (Матић 2000: 8). He under-
lines justice and righteousness, love of freedom and Orthodoxy as 
defining components of a collective political pattern in the Serbian 
tradition, which is in his opinion verified by the medieval laws such 
as Nomocanon of Saint Sava and Dušan’s Code and recent history, 
respectively (Матић 2000: 123). The veracity of these claims is 
corroborated not only by the Serbian literature of the 19th and 20th 
centuries but also the works of authors, such as Jovan Cvijić and 
Vladimir Dvorniković who analytically examined the Serbian 
political tradition. It is precisely via Dvorniković’s deliberations, 
that Matić has found the roots of conscious self-sacrifice of the 
Kosovo heroes to the “grand idea of spirituality”, which, at the 
time of Kosovo tragedy, had already been deeply rooted among the 
common folk, dating back to the period of the Nemanjić dynasty. 
Under the circumstances where the Serbian people were assigned 
a role of European Christian civilisation defenders against the 
onslaught of Islam, that spirituality inspired Serbs to fight hero-
ically, and, if necessary, die as martyrs (Матић 2000: 32-42). The 
historical vertical of the Kosovo myth, that indigenous Serbian 
Kosovo cult as a specific variant of heroic Christianity, originated 
from that religious cultural concept (Матић 2000: 37). The Kosovo 
myth therefore “originated in the conditions of utter peril for the 
people, under invasion of a cruel Asian conqueror and acute need 
for general mobilisation for the purpose of defence and survival” 
(Матић 2005: 390). Nevertheless, although it initially served as 
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a response to immediate needs, the Kosovo myth has endured for 
centuries and traditionally has an important role in formulation of 
the Serbian political pattern. 
As the loss of Kosovo de facto has happened once again in 
the recent years, the question arises as to how great influence the 
Kosovo myth exerts today. It is particularly compelling to envis-
age the issue relating to the European integration and the fact that 
recognition of the self-proclaimed independence of Kosovo and 
Metohija is often stated as an essential condition and a key obstacle 
to Serbia’s accession to the European Union. When contemplating 
the situation, the following three facts should be taken into account. 
First, for the survival and reinforcement of the European Union, 
as well as its further expansion, it is important to establish and 
empower a common, even if very loosely defined, supranational 
European identity. That is obstructed by traditional understanding 
of the national identity widely spread in Serbia, which is based “on 
common cultural heritage, language, collective myths and memory, 
symbols and emotional kin ties “, i.e. peculiarities that suprana-
tional identities do not possess. Such a traditional view of identity 
is often accompanied by a conviction that supranational identity 
endangers the national one and poses threat to its preservation 
(Vasović 2010: 84). Thus, the European identity is at times seen as 
a threat to the Serbian national identity. Secondly, the majority of 
EU countries supported, with the most powerful ones even actively 
lobbying for, the Kosovo declaration of independence, which is 
deemed by a large part of the Serbian public as nothing less than 
a hostile act directly aimed against interests of the Serbian people, 
i.e. the citizens of Serbia. Thirdly, it should be taken into consider-
ation that one of the main morals of the Kosovo myth integral to its 
metaphysical-Christian segment and mainly used as a basis of the 
folk ethics of Vidovdan (Ђурић 1988), is the one of self-sacrifice 
that Knez Lazar opted for when he was forced to choose between 
earthly and heavenly kingdom, between transient and eternal life 
(Пешић 2018: 36). The question arises as to whether and how 
large a portion of the public in Serbia, consciously or not, draws 
parallels between a dichotomy EU-Kosovo, which is put in front 
of them, and the dilemma presented to the Knez Lazar? It is an 
irrefutable fact that Kosovo and Metohija along with the Kosovo 
myth are an inherent part of culture, history, religion and folklore 
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of the Serbian people, and, without doubt, it is not easy to renounce 
them, even if in return personal and collective prosperity is offered, 
which is deemed by a certain portion of Serbian public to be a 
potential benefit of the accession to the EU. In this paper we will 
endeavor to establish what percentage of the public is willing to 
make such a sacrifice regarding current attempt at a resolution of 
the Kosovo question.
The process of European integration and resolution of the 
Kosovo question as mutually conditioning processes
Upon the unilateral declaration of independence by self-gov-
ernment authorities in Kosovo and Metohija, the public had to 
tackle the following two issues. First, the traumatic exposure to the 
loss of a part of the territory which throughout centuries have been 
depicted as a “cradle of the Serbian people” and then acceptance 
of the fact that henceforth the process of negotiations over Serbia’s 
accession to the EU will be conditioned by resolution of the Kosovo 
question. Although, as previously stated on several occasions, in 
Serbian history the Kosovo myth has had a national liberation role, 
the role of the myth today is dubious and it is uncertain whether 
it will undergo yet another transformation in the process of the 
European integration. 
Even though the saga of Serbia and the EU dates back to 
2000, the first official step which marked the commencement of 
the negotiations was signing the Stabilisation and Accession Agree-
ment (SAA) in Luxembourg, on April 29, 2008. As mentioned 
above, in the same year on February 17, the provisional self-gov-
ernment authorities in Kosovo and Metohija adopted the Declara-
tion of Independence. This process of separation was supported by 
international community, first of all the USA and majority of EU 
states. The only outcome acceptable to Priština authorities is for 
Serbia to recognise Kosovo* as an independent, sovereign country. 
Under these new circumstances, Serbia was coerced to accept 
European Union terms in order to make progress in the dialogue 
with the authorities in Priština. Thus Serbia gained the status of 
candidate country for the EU membership on March 2, 2012, only 
after the negotiations between Belgrade and Priština opened on 
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March 8, 2011.1 The European Union took charge of the mediation 
in the negotiation process which was an obvious solution as both 
sides aspire to EU membership. The dilemma over whether Western 
powers intended to remove the United Nations from facilitation 
of the negotiations between Belgrade and Priština, if ever present, 
was finally resolved. The first round of dialogue started at a tech-
nical level, but in 2012 was upgraded to a higher level under the 
auspices of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security and Vice-president of the European Commission. In March 
2012, the Council of Europe granted Serbia a candidate status. The 
goal of Brussels Agreement 2 signed during the ninth round of the 
dialogue, held on April 19, 2013, in Brussels, is normalization of 
relations between Belgrade and Priština, and according to not only 
the Brussels officials but also Belgrade and Priština ones, represent-
ed a significant step ahead. By signing the Brussels Agreement in 
2013 both Belgrade and Priština committed to not sabotaging the 
opposing side in the process of European integration. 
The EU representatives aspire to find both the solution to 
Kosovo’s* political status and relations between Belgrade and 
Priština within “a common European future”, which both sides 
set as their strategic goals and objectives. There are two explana-
tions as to the decision of policy makers in Brussels to adopt this 
approach. First of all, during the accession process, the EU exerts 
the maximum effort to prevent the “importation” of the ethnic con-
flicts that can be a threat to regional stability, and consequently to 
stability of the European Union itself. We will take the opportunity 
to briefly draw attention to the fact that the European Union insists 
on the candidate states resolving any contentious issues and mutual 
1) In the European Commission Opinion on Serbia’s application for the membership 
of the European Union, was a recommendation to the Council of Europe to grant 
Serbia a candidate status, the following is stated: “Serbia has considerably progressed 
towards fulfilling the political criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 
1993, as well as the conditions of the Stabilization and Association Process, provided 
that progress continues and that practical solutions are found to the problem with 
Kosovo.” (Pregovaračka poglavlja – 35 koraka ka Evropskoj Uniji)
2) The official title of this document is Prvi sporazum o principima koji regulišu 
normalizaciju odnosa. As the main goals of the Agreement we can highlight the 
following: dissolution of the parallel institutions in northern Kosovo* and integration 
of civil servants in the Kosovo* institutional framework, and offer to Kosovo Serb 
of a certain level of self-government through an Association/Community of Serb 
Majority Municipalities.
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disagreements during the negotiation process, specifically address-
ing territorial disputes. If we take this fact into account, Serbia’s 
journey to the candidate status will take longer than with the other 
post-communist states. In other words, the process of European 
integration is in Serbia’s case further burdened by traumatic loss of 
a part of the territory. Secondly, despite their numerous differences 
and confrontations, both Serbian and Albanian side agree on the 
European Union not having an alternative, at least it is what highest 
officials on both sides repeat ad nauseam in their public appearanc-
es. It seems that the European officials estimated that both sides 
would be more motivated to participate and achieve better results if 
these two processes were mutually conditioning. How accurate this 
estimate is time will tell, but, without doubt, in spite of numerous 
successes of the cohesion policies in the membership negotiations, 
approaching the European Union does not possess such magical 
power when it comes to resolving the political status of Kosovo*. 
In literature, there are countless interpretations of the dialogue aim, 
i.e. the current negotiations, and majority of them concur that it is 
seeking normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Priština. 
Through “full normalisation of the relations between two sides, 
achieved within EU membership negotiations, in the case of Ser-
bia, and negotiations on SAA, and afterwards EU membership, in 
the case of Kosovo, the ultimate goal, common to both Belgrade 
and Priština is to be reached: the EU membership” (Janjić 2013: 
11). It is the estimate of the authors of this paper that the progress 
towards the EU membership has proved to be an efficient means of 
creating advantageous circumstances for dialogue and negotiations 
continuation (Janjić 2013: 13). The other group of authors surmises 
that the whole process of the relations normalisation, especially if 
attitude and engagement of the international community and the 
EU are taken into account, happens at the expense of Serbia and 
conclude that “a crawling acknowledgement of the secession of the 
province through the EU accession negotiations is taking place” 
(Јовановић 2018: 8). 
The conditioning policies in the EU membership negotiations 
are no novelty; however, Serbia’s position is unique as a mecha-
nism for monitoring agreements implementation is weaved into the 
one of the negotiation chapters as a part of the dialogue between 
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Belgrade and Priština.3 By acquiescing to this fact, the government 
representatives of Serbia provided an official confirmation that 
the process of European integration and resolution of Kosovo and 
Metohija’s status are processes of mutual conditioning. On the other 
hand, it cannot be negated that citizens of Serbia are confronted, 
as judged by some authors, with a false and dangerous dilemma 
“Kosovo or Europe” (Еберг & Митић 2005: 142). Therefore, the 
motivation of the authors of this paper to pose a research question: 
To what extent the viewpoint of the political status of Kosovo and 
Metohija influences the public attitude to Serbia’s EU membership?
The analysis of the public opinion
Upon providing a broader insight into the significance and 
dynamics of the Kosovo myth topicalisation, and, ultimately, cor-
relating the European integration process and resolution of the 
Kosovo question, the analysis of the empirical study results is 
performed with the aim of establishing whether the public is aware 
of this correlation and whether the dilemma Kosovo or the EU 
still figures as one of the major rethorical questions in the political 
discourse of Serbia. 
The Centre for politicological research and public opinion 
at the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade conducted a study 
entitled The Notions of the EU and Russia in the Serbian Pub-
lic. The study is devoted to the viewpoints of Serbian citizens on 
international politics, and Serbia’s relations with Russia and the 
European Union in particular. The quoted study relied on quanti-
tative methodology, where a structured on-line questionnaire was 
used as a means of collecting the data. The respondents completed 
the questionnaire independently, on a computer, a smart phone or 
other device with Internet access. The questionnaire was made on 
pen-source platform LimeSurvey, installed on IDN server. The poll 
was conducted in October and November 2018. The respondents 
were asked to access the poll in two ways, so that the total sample 
consisted of two subsamples: email subsample and ’Snowball’ 
subsample. The survey was done on a sample of 3,270 respondents 
in the Republic of Serbia. 
3) The chapter in question is chapter 35 called “Other issues”.
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The underlying hypothesis, which was the basis of this paper, 
is that the question of Kosovo and Metohija affects the public 
opinion on Serbia’s membership in the European Union. Therefore, 
this paper relies on the following propositions:
• The European integration process and the resolution of the 
Kosovo question are mutually conditioned;
• The prevailing public opinion is that Serbia is in favour of 
joining the EU;
• The Kosovo question has an impact on the public opinion 
on Serbia’s EU membership;
• The EU support of Kosovo’s secession affects negatively 
the public opinion on Serbia’s EU membership.
The data are presented graphically and grouped according 
to the initial propositions.
The survey results indicate that Serbian citizens do not per-
ceive a clear intention of the European Union to allow Serbia’s 
accession. To the question: What is the position of the European 
Union on Serbia’s accession?, the majority of the respondents 
replied that the EU is uncertain of its decision to accept Serbia 
as its member. Furthermore, 34% of the respondents believe that 
the EU has no intention of allowing for Serbia’s accession. The 
smallest percentage of the respondents assumes that the EU wants 
that (24% of them) (Chart 1).
Chart 1: Position of the European Union on Serbia’s accession 
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The proposition that the public opinion is that Serbia is in 
favour of joining the EU has been confirmed. The survey results 
show that in the event of a referendum on Serbia’s accession to 
the European Union, a little above a half of the respondents (54%) 
would vote for, while 39% would vote against. Only 7% of the 
respondents would not vote in the referendum (Chart 2).
Chart 2: Public opinion on Serbia’s EU membership
Similarly, 52% of respondents (29% of whom completely 
agree) view Serbia’s accession to the European Union as a better 
solution than the preservation of status quo. Less than a half does 
not (40%), while 8% have no clear position on this issue. 
It has become evident that 79% of respondents trust the EU 
policies on the issue of Kosovo and Metohija’s independence seem 
of importance for the creation of their viewpoint of the EU, among 
whom more than a half (55%) thinks that it is of great importance. 
A fifth of the respondents (21%) believe that the EU policies on 
the issue of Kosovo and Metohija’s independence have no impact 
on the creation of their viewpoint of the EU. 
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Chart 3: Significance of the issue of Kosovo and Metohija’s 
independence
 
Along with the abovementioned, it should be emphasised 
that a perception of the current EU policies supporting the seces-
sion of Kosovo and Metohija ‒ 94% of respondents endorses the 
proposition provided, 5% holds a neutral position, while merely 
1% of the respondents states that the current policy is for Kosovo 
to remain within Serbia. These findings can be clear guidelines to 
all political actors that the process of European integration and 
resolution of the Kosovo question, i.e. negotiations on the rela-
tions normalisation, must not be presented as mutually exclusive 
categories. If the strategy of confronting the public with a choice 
between Kosovo and the EU is settled on, the level of uncertainty of 
citizens opting for the EU increases significantly. Thus, once more 
it is confirmed that EU membership is not a sufficient compensation 
for the recognition of Kosovo independence and that resolution 
of the Kosovo question still has potential to become “a blocking 
factor to a further process of consolidation of political situation” 
(Mojsilović 2010: 173) in the Republic of Serbia.
More than a half of the respondents (58%) have demonstrated 
resignation and belief that, no matter what is done concerning this 
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issue, Kosovo will become an independent state. It is disputable 
whether these findings can be interpreted as Serbian citizens’ com-
ing to terms with the situation and being aware of the fact that a 
predominant wish for Kosovo and Metohija to remain part of Serbia 
cannot be fulfilled, at least in the foreseeable future. None the less, 
a clear conclusion of this is that the citizens themselves are aware 
of the fact that Serbia is allowed very little room for manoeuvre 
in the negotiations on relations normalisation and that a return to 
a previous state of affairs is virtually impossible. Provided that 
Serbia recognised Kosovo’s independence, it is highly debatable 
how drastic reactions of those most ardent opponents of Kosovo’s 
independence would be. 
The idea of partition of Kosovo and Metohija as a compen-
sation for recognising Kosovo’s independence has been publically 
proposed on several occasions by the high-ranking government 
officials, and during 2018 and 2019 such a partition has been anew 
put “in the ether” as one of the possible options. The respondents’ 
answers indicate that division of Kosovo* into Serbian and Alba-
nian parts is an acceptable solution to 38% of respondents. How-
ever, there is still a compelling majority (61% of them) which 
maintains that Kosovo and Metohija should remain part of Serbia 
(Chart 4). 
Chart 4. Public attitude towards the Kosovo question
Through use of non-parametric method, Chi-square test 
(independent normally distributed data), a high correlation between 
the independence issue and EU membership has been established 
(Phi=0, 669). 
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Table 1: Correlation between EU membership and the issue of 
Kosovo’s independence 
Attitude towards Serbian 
membership in EU
Attitude towards accepting 
Kosovo independence Total:
Yes No
For Accesion 67% 33% 100
Against accession 2% 98% 100
Total: 37% 63% 100%
Although the majority of respondents support Serbia’s mem-
bership in the EU (54%), the situation changes if that membership 
is conditioned by the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, with 
the percentage of those against joining the EU rising to 63%. A little 
more than a third of the respondents (37%) would support Serbia’s 
accession to the EU even if the independence of Kosovo and Meto-
hija was recognised. No less than a third of the respondents who 
would have voted for Serbia’s accession to the EU (33% of them) 
would have abstained from voting in the referendum in case of it 
being conditioned by the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, 
while two thirds (67%) would not have changed their mind even 
under these circumstances.
Conclusion 
The study results have confirmed all four of the propositions 
provided. The first proposition of the prevailing public opinion 
that Serbia is in favour of joining the EU has been confirmed 
both in view of the fact that more than a half of the respondents 
would vote for accession and that the majority deems Serbia’s EU 
membership to be better option than the preservation of status quo. 
The second proposition of Kosovo’s independence and Serbia’s 
EU membership being mutually conditioned has also been verified 
since there is a high correlation between these two positions. The 
third proposition of the issue of Kosovo’s independence having an 
impact on the public opinion on Serbia’s EU membership has been 
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also asserted by the fact that, when the public is confronted with 
a position that joining the European Union implies recognition of 
Kosovo and Metohija’s independence, there is a significant drop in 
support for Serbia’s EU membership. In support of this claim there 
are also findings that a third of the public, who would vote for the 
accession to the EU, would abstain from voting if the condition 
was recognition of Kosovo and Metohija’s independence, which 
at the same time confirms the fourth proposition of EU support 
of Kosovo’s secession affecting negatively the public opinion on 
Serbia’s EU membership.
All of the above mentioned suggests that Kosovo and Meto-
hija’s status remains as an important factor in creating the pub-
lic opinion on Serbia’s EU membership. The results analysis has 
confirmed the underlying hypothesis that the Kosovo myth still 
figures as a determinant of Serbian citizens’ political behaviour, 
particularly with regard to accession to the EU and the fact that final 
resolution of Kosovo and Metohija’s political status and recognition 
of unilaterally declared independence are proffered as the key con-
ditions for the long-awaited EU membership. These findings clearly 
indicate the policy of mutual conditioning, the EU or Kosovo and 
Metohija, will not speed the European integration process, but on 
the contrary it is more likely to significantly impede the process.
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